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ABSTRACT  
Traditionally, educational theory has been couched as modes of human action through concepts 
such as poiesis and praxis. Inasmuch as poiesis and praxis have significantly shaped educational 
theory, we argue that such modes of action – if considered as mutually exclusive – do not 
sufficiently explain the interrelationship between educational theory and practice. Firstly, we 
extend the notion of action as explained by Arendt. Next, we offer an account of Agamben’s 
‘opening of rhythm’, which integrates the notions of poiesis and praxis to pave the way for an 
understanding of educational theory as creative will that moves human action from enacting the 
unexpected into ‘an increasingly free and rarified atmosphere’. Secondly, in re-examining the 
Aristotelian concepts of poiesis and praxis, we argue that Agamben’s ‘opening of rhythm’ extends 
the Arendtian notion of action to perform the unexpected, and offers an as yet unexplored lens 
through which to understand the nexus between educational theory and practice. 
Keywords: poiesis, praxis, educational theory, practice, rhythmic action 
 
THEORISING EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
In this article we offer a defence of why educational theory should rightfully be considered as 
a mode of action. In doing so, we contest the misplaced dichotomy between educational theory 
and practice, and instead argue that a nexus exists between the two – meaning that not only is 
the one informed by the other, but that neither can exist without the other. When one acts, one 
does something – whether embarking upon something or engaging with someone. When one 
acts, one thinks; even when one thinks that one has acted without thinking (a thoughtless 
action), one thinks. The activities of producing (poiesis) and doing (praxis), embarking on or 
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thinking can be couched as actions of a particular kind. So when one theorises one does 
something. In this way, one acts whether it is in the form of thinking, contemplating or 
(re)constructing meanings. That is, one brings into action what one has considered or thought. 
This action does not occur independently from what one thinks, or imagines, or contemplates. 
So, in a way, theory is inherent in practices. And as the theory improves, the practice might 
follow suit or become more enhanced, and, in turn, the practice might reinforce or alter the 
theory. Theory and practice, therefore, are never disconnected. To avoid theory is to become 
unmindful of what a practice actually is. That is, theory and practice are interrelated and 
constitute a nexus according to which they unfold as forms of human action.  
As a backdrop to our argument in defence of educational theory as ‘rhythmic’ action, we 
draw on some contestations of the concept. Not only does theory have multiple meanings, which 
creates confusion, explains Thomas (1997, 75), but contemporary debate on methods of inquiry 
has concerned theory’s fragility, not its utility. According to Carr (2006, 136), educational 
theory has been criticised for being nothing other than the name given to the various futile 
attempts to stand outside of educational practices in order to explain and justify them. And yet 
despite this fragility, says Thomas (1997, 76), the continuing resolve of educational theory can 
be ascribed to the absence of a community language system by which education academics and 
researchers understand theory; and drawing its epistemological legitimacy from the success of 
theory in other fields. The notion of theory as an intellectual endeavour is problematic in that it 
implies that any conjoining of words is a theoretical enterprise. To Thomas (1997, 79), the 
commonly held view that theory is simply the opposite of practice, constructing a theory-
practice continuum, implies that theory is to be understood as speculation and book-learning. 
Rather, says Carr (2006, 140), not only is theory everything that practice is not, but educational 
theory is abstract rather than concrete, general rather than particular, context-free, rather than 
context-dependent.  
Carr (2006, 146) maintains that while the existence of educational theory is acknowledged 
in relation to both educational research and the idea of practice, the apparent discomfort around 
educational theory is evident, on the one hand, in the view that although educational theory 
informs practice, educational theory is itself not a form of practice. On the other hand, says 
Thomas (1997, 76), educational theory is viewed as an instrument for reinforcing an existing 
set of practices and methods in education. If one considers the view that educational theory is 
nothing other than that which consolidates existing practices and methods in education, then it 
follows that educational theory offers something to practices and methods in education. This 
intimation already implies that practices and methods of education are somewhat impoverished 
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if not guided by the notion of an educational theory. In this way, educational theory contributes 
towards making practices and methods of education what they are – that is, constituting and/or 
reinforcing other aspects of education. Put differently educational theory makes up or 
constitutes education without which the latter would not necessarily be able to be education. 
Similarly, the argument that educational theory is itself not a form of practice but informs 
teaching, is an acknowledgement that teaching cannot be teaching without being constituted by 
educational theory – that is, educational theory underscores teaching and hence becomes its 
(teaching) rationale or that which makes teaching what it is.  
Our argument in defence of educational theory is premised on an understanding that 
education and some of its forms ‒ whether, teaching, learning, or research practices and /or 
methods ‒ cannot be, if unconstituted by educational theory. In a way, educational theory is 
that form of thinking (making or doing) – that is, practice or human action – which gives 
education its distinctive form. As such, education cannot be conceived of as motionless or 
unchanging, and it for this reason that we find Agamben (1999) appealing. Using Aristotle’s 
(2004) conception of rhythm, and in drawing an analogy between art and a musical piece, 
Agamben describes how it is possible to perceive rhythm as ‘something that escapes the 
incessant flight of instants and appears almost as the presence of an atemporal dimension in 
time. In the same way, when we are before a work of art or a landscape bathed in the light of 
its own presence, we perceive a stop in time, as though we were suddenly thrown into a more 
original time.’ Agamben (1999, 58) explains that ‘there is a stop, an interruption in the incessant 
flow of instants that, coming from the future, sinks into the past, and this interruption, this stop, 
is precisely what gives and reveals the particular status, the mode of presence proper to the 
work of art or the landscape we have before our eyes’. It is Agamben’s depiction of an 
‘incessant flow of instances’ that comes from the future and ‘sinks into the past’ – the sense of 
an ‘opening of rhythm’ – which, we will argue, offers a unique lens through which to understand 
the nexus between educational theory and practice.  
 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS DICHOTOMIZED AND LINKED MODES OF  
HUMAN ACTION  
Drawing on the seminal thoughts of MacIntyre and Arendt, respectively, the ensuing discussion 
will focus on how educational theory has been couched as modes of human actions through the 
concepts of poiesis (making) and praxis (doing). In a dialogue with Dunne, MacIntyre (2002, 
5) contends that although each teacher is engaged in initiating her/his students into some 
practice – the use for which and the point of which the student cannot yet know – ‘[T]eaching 
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itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices’. 
For us such a MacIntyrean idea resonates with the notion of poiesis that is considered by 
Aristotle as producing say, a practice. In return, MacIntyre explains, the student can have one 
of two responses, s/he can either learn to care about ‘getting it right’, or learn to feel a sense of 
her own powers in getting it right. It is MacIntyre’s (2002, 8‒9) argument, that while teachers 
are involved in a variety of practices and that teaching is an ingredient in every practice, 
teaching is never more than a means – that is, an endeavour towards making something or 
poiesis. As such, he maintains, that teaching has no purpose beyond that of introducing students 
to the purpose of activities. All teaching is for the sake of something else and so teaching does 
not have its own goods.  
The contention that teaching is never more than a means, and because it is for the sake of 
something else, does not have its own goods, is of course a contentious one. One can argue that 
teaching contributes to shaping the life worlds of students and in this way teaching produces a 
good that benefits students. Although the act of teaching is on forming the student, one would 
not yet know what might become of the student which does not justify discounting teaching as 
a means to an end as well. Nevertheless, what we deduce from MacIntyre’s argument that 
teaching is a means only, is the assumption that there is something in poiesis that makes an 
educative practice, such as, teaching what it is. If teaching were just a means, then being so is 
inextricably dependent on that which makes teaching what it is. More specifically, the means 
of teaching (poiesis) constitutes teaching in a particular way which we refer to as its educational 
theory.  
In acceding to Dunne’s argument that the dialectic between the practice of teaching and 
the institution of the school is faithfully reflected in the case of teaching and school, MacIntyre 
(2002, 10) argues that what is important is to recognise that each (student) life is a single, if 
complex, narrative of a particular subject, someone whose life is a whole into which the 
different parts have to be integrated so that the pursuit of the goods of the home reinforces both 
the pursuit of the goods of the school, and the other diverse goods of a particular life. The 
particular mode of human action, then, that the student needs to embark on is constituted by an 
integration of that which is encountered in the private sphere (the goods of the home), the 
educational sphere (the school or university), as well as the social or world sphere, as 
encountered through a particular life and in others. The complexity of this integrated narrative 
is, of course, further complicated, or enhanced by the pursuit of integration in itself. Indeed, an 
integrated narrative might not necessarily be possible, or desirable, for that matter – leaving the 
student in conflict with the goods of the school or home, or both. Aware of this, MacIntyre 
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(2002, 10) acknowledges that to integrate each life is not only a task, which might never be 
completed, but the task itself, is to understand those diverse goods as contributing to the 
ultimate good of the individual. This important type of understanding, he explains, is primarily 
practical rather than theoretical, and to acquire it is to see each individual human life as an 
answer to the question: ‘What is the ultimate human good?’  
It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that while the theoretical pursuit of the human good 
might in some sense hold a common understanding – meaning, that the pursuit of the human 
good must hold some connection, or some harmony with the pursuit of the social good – it 
would, however, be unreasonable to infer that the practical pursuit thereof would be equally 
harmonious, linear, or indeed, attainable. In expanding on MacIntyre, then, the pursuit of the 
human good might not be in the attainment of the pursuit, so that the pursuit reaches its 
objective, but rather that the attainment thereof is in the pursuit itself, since the ultimate good 
is in fact, one of always being in pursuit. Inasmuch as MacIntyre himself attributes the reason 
for the ongoing pursuit to practices themselves, such practices can unfold only as a consequence 
of the reasons that make them justifiable pursuits. And, this is what we refer to as educational 
theory – those reasons that make the pursuit of practices possible and without which practices 
would not be in existence. In a different way, the practices of teaching in a MacIntyrean sense 
are enacted according to reasons or means which underscore the enactment of such practices – 
a matter of poiesis (means) of making the actions what they are or can yet become. Thus, 
whereas it seems as if MacIntyre dichotomizes poiesis and praxis, our understanding is that 
such a bifurcation is not plausible. Hence, we move on to a discussion of the interconnectedness 
between making and doing, more specifically theory and practice.  
 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS LINKED MODES OF HUMAN ACTION  
In asserting that ‘Men are conditioned beings because everything they come into contact with 
turns immediately into a condition of their existence’, Arendt (1958, 9) draws a distinction 
between vita activa (active life) and vita contemplativa (contemplative life). The vita activa is 
‘[A]lways rooted in a world of men and of manmade things which it never leaves or altogether 
transcends ... All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is 
only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men’ (Arendt 1958, 22). Based 
on this explication of vita activa, she identifies three autonomous activities ‒ labour, work and 
action – within four possible domains: the political, the social, the public, and the private. Yet, 
even in offering the two visions of vita activa and vita contemplativa, it is not Arendt’s (1958, 
14) intention to divert or juxtapose the two. In its reflections and deliberations on that which 
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might exist outside the social and political – that is, a form of transcendence – vita 
contemplativa is seen by Arendt as ‘as the only truly free way of life’. 
Through vita activa – labour, work and action, that is, praxis – it is possible, says Arendt, 
to encounter a particular way of being, which is other than what we have thus far encountered, 
by the simple virtue of humanity. As Aristotle’s ‘rational animals’, it is possible for humans to 
assume particular forms of existences, to construct new meanings, new ways of being, which 
will make them better, and able to achieve more, because, according to Arendt (1958, 9), 
‘Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes 
the character of a condition of human existence’. To Arendt, human existence is signified as 
human due to the fact of plurality – meaning that each human being is unique and at the same 
time equal with all other human beings by sharing this precondition. In this sense, Lenz (2011, 
17) explains that Arendt regards human existence as crucially political, which, for her, means 
being capable of taking part in the construction of the modes and conditions of living together. 
Arendt (1958, 175) argues that ‘Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, 
has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, they could neither 
understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the 
needs of those who will come after them.’ This plurality, says Lenz (2011, 17), results in the 
capacity and the need to create a common realm of existence, or in Arendt’s terms ‒ ‘world’ ‒ 
as the space which emerges from human action and interaction.  
To Arendt, education creates the medium and space for individuals to come together so 
that they might reach their individual potential by actively engaging with each other. By 
participating and engaging with the other, they bring their individual pasts to a collective 
‘world’ – which allows them to engage with the ‘world’ – thereby ensuring that the ‘world’ is 
sustained. Education, for Arendt, has the function of enabling human beings, especially the 
‘newcomers’ in the chains of generations, to actively participate in the maintenance and 
continuance of ‘world’ and thereby realise their human potential. As such, clarifies Lenz (2011, 
17), it is possible to imagine education as a process integrating all members of a society in the 
constant construction, reconstruction and maintenance of social, political and cultural life.  
For us, the fascination of Arendt’s (1958, 178) argument is in her emphasis on action as 
central to human existence in order that people perform the unexpected, the ‘infinitely 
improbable’. This means that human action is boundless, uncertain of its outcome, and ever-
recurring. Through coming into contact, the human existence, says Arendt, is able to assume 
whatever condition it desires. As such, humans are able to construct new understandings, and 
new ways of being, because their condition is only made visible through acting, working and 
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doing with others. What this means is that the human condition is not only undetermined and 
undecided, but it is always in a state of becoming. When teachers, then, do the work of teaching, 
they need both the theory of education and the practice of teaching to do so. Similarly, when 
students learn, they need the theory, and the practical application thereof in order to demonstrate 
that they have indeed learnt. The student shows that (s)he can solve for x as evidence that (s)he 
has understood and is therefore able to realise and apply what (s)he has learnt. The work of 
teaching and learning, therefore, involves both theory and practice. And because of its 
indeterminacy and endless possibility, it remains in a perpetual state of becoming and un-
finality. Thus, whereas poiesis is concerned with the reasons for acting, praxis with the 
culmination of the reasons into critical action, vita activa – as a combination of poiesis and 
praxis – is concerned with action towards the unexpected, that is, what is yet to come. Through 
vita activa humans show a constant willingness to engage, and change their minds to start anew 
(Arendt 1958, 240).  
Thus far we have shown how the philosophical conceptions of poiesis and praxis, 
informed by active life, always invoke both theory as contemplative action, and doing as 
emancipatory and undeterminable action – that is, through being mindful of the end purposes 
of interpretation (poiesis), emancipation and becoming (praxis). By extending the afore-
mentioned integrated view, we will next turn our attention to Agamben’s (1999) radical 
Aristotelian conception of rhythm. The two concepts, poiesis and praxis, cannot be separated – 
and that such a nexus has a better chance of being realised if explored through Agamben’s 
notion of an ‘opening of rhythm’. In his integration of the concepts, poiesis and praxis, the 
distinctiveness of Agamben’s ‘opening of rhythm’ paves the way for an understanding of 
educational theory as creative will that moves people into ‘an increasingly free and rarified 
atmosphere’ beyond just doing the unexpected, the improbable as Arendt contends. To us, 
merely looking at MacIntyre and Arendt, does not offer us enough in advancing our argument 
of a theory-practice nexus. While Arendt’s explication of human existence being able to assume 
whatever condition it desires, takes us towards the unexpected, it does not shift beyond a linear 
exploration of poiesis and praxis – that is moving linearly in some direction from a means to an 
ends, or vice versa. What we now wish to do is to argue that the movement towards producing 
and doing cannot just be some sort of linear progression, as such an understanding would 
discount the view that things happen unexpectedly and haphazardly. It is for this reason that we 
offer an account of a non-linear understanding of the relationship between theory and practice 
– an understanding that lends itself to rhythmic action. Arendt’s (1958, 246) aversion to doing 
things along ‘a path secured in all directions’ is noted as being self-defeating in the pursuit of 
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conducting human affairs. She is quick to caution against the use of mutual and linear thinking 
as enormously risky for starting anew. It is the latter view that we hope to extend on the basis 
that unexpected new beginnings cannot exclusively rely on mutuality and linear progression, 
but rather, on rhythmic action. For an expansion of this idea, we now turn to a discussion of the 
work of Giorgio Agamben.  
 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS RHYTHMIC MODES OF HUMAN ACTION  
Praxis, explains Agamben (1999), has been understood as the idea of the will that finds its 
immediate expression in an act. By contrast, poiesis is the experience of pro-duction into 
presence – meaning, that something passed from non-being to being, from concealment into the 
full light of the work. Stated differently, says Lewis (2011, 249), while praxis has become the 
active intervention of a subject imbued with a god-like Will to Power (thereby dominating the 
world), poiesis is a pro-duction of a world for human action. Yet, states Agamben (1999, 42), 
the status of a man’s dwelling on earth is a practical one, because of his productive status ‒ the 
essential character of poiesis ‘was not its aspect as a practical and voluntary process but its 
being a mode of truth understood as unveiling’. Agamben (1999, 68) explains that according to 
Aristotle, the roots of praxis are found in the very condition of man as an animal – that is, a 
living being, who is constituted by the very principle of motion that characterizes life – ‘all of 
man’s doing—that of the artist and the craftsman as well as that of the workman and the 
politician – is praxis, that is, a manifestation of a will that produces a concrete effect’. In this 
sense, motion, according to Agamben (1999, 43), is to be understood as the human will in terms 
of desire, volition and craving – conceived by Aristotle as will, drive, and vital impulse. 
Continuing, Agamben (1999, 43) contends, ‘For while poiesis constructs the space where man 
finds his certitude and where he ensures the freedom and duration of his action, the 
presupposition of work is, on the contrary, bare biological existence, the cyclical processes of 
the human body, whose metabolism and whose energy depend on the basic products of labor’.  
To Agamben (1999, 44), the notion of work (doing) is so intimately tied to the biological 
cycle of humans, that any attempts to argue differently have always returned to an interpretation 
of life, of man as a living being in which the philosophy of man’s ‘doing’ continues to be a 
philosophy of life. He explains that everything is rhythm: the entire destiny of man is one 
heavenly rhythm, just as every work of art is one rhythm. Agamben maintains that rhythm is 
the structure of poiesis, which is a particular form of pro-duction distinct from praxis (Lewis 
2011, 249). Rhythm, says Agamben, is not structure, but is instead the principle of presence 
that opens and maintains the work of art in its original space. Paradoxically, he explains, it is 
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neither calculable nor rational; yet it is also not irrational. The essence of rhythm, he continues, 
is to flow, as in the case of water, or a musical piece – which flows, and then stops. As such, 
says Agamben (1999, 58‒62), ‘[w]e perceive rhythm as something that escapes the incessant 
flight of instants and appears almost as the presence of an atemporal dimension in time’. 
In his analogy between music and art, Agamben states that rhythm is something that 
escapes an ‘incessant flight of instance’. If something does not appear incessantly, and 
instantaneously, it actually appears rhythmically, in other words – there is a moment of holding 
and giving back – as one might listen and be moved by the crescendos of music. Agamben’s 
argument is that in the same way that we listen to music, we look at art, where we experience a 
suspension in time in which you reflect on the painting and re-depict the image as the painting 
reveals itself. In Agamben (1999, 62) fashion, beholding a work of art is not a static action, but 
rather ecstatic – ‘It means ecstasy in the epochal in the opening of rhythm which gives and 
holds back ...’. What we infer from Agamben’s use of the notion of rhythm in relation to 
educational theory and practice are two things: First, rhythm converges poiesis (making 
/production) and doing; and, second, rhythm signifies an elastic movement of giving and 
holding back. In light of these two aspects, if we look at the nexus between theory and practice 
as the opening of rhythm then momentarily one can think, or hold back one’s thoughts as one 
embarks on a practice of making meaning of what encounters, and of the world. It might be that 
at times the theory will be more pronounced than the practice, and other times the practice might 
be more accentuated than the theory without the nexus being dismantled. For example, if the 
relationship between a supervisor and a doctoral student is open to rhythm, then there is already 
an acknowledgement that the work will have both a theoretical and practical orientation – a 
convergence – on the basis that the educational experience is not averse to the theory-practice 
nexus. So, at times, theoretical discussions might foreground discussion as the practice of 
theorising in relation to literature and human action are pursued. Other times, and perhaps 
concurrently, the student’s practical bias to the project might hold sway and she envisages that 
the practice informs the theory. In other words, there appears to be a harmonisation between a 
practical element of the thesis and its (in)commensurability with the theoretical ideas that are 
articulated in the thesis. To this end, a rhythmic nexus between theory and practice addresses 
the often pseudo separation between theory and practice.  
Unlike Arendt (1958) who considers action as a manifestation of the act of making into 
the act of doing and vice versa, Agamben (1999) views action as making (poiesis) and doing 
(praxis) rhythmically – that is, the potentiality of making and doing is always there as long as 
such acts are pursued concomitantly and in resonance with sporadic moments of interruption 
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(holding back and opening up simultaneously). For example, teaching can at once be an act of 
withholding speech on the part of educators who provoke students to ‘come to speech’ by 
themselves and, they (educators) articulating speech as an opening up of their lived experiences 
as they endeavour to evoke the potentialities of their students. In short, teaching becomes both 
provoking and evoking speech – that is, making and producing ruptured rhythmic action as 
opposed to smooth and unstriated action. Lewis (2011, 251) clarifies that through negating any 
notion of linear chronology unfolding, the rhythm of poiesis is simultaneously projective and 
recursive. Smooth action limits possibilities towards the improbable, whereas unstriated action 
deters the possibility towards unexpected ruptures in thought and action in the same way a 
teacher transmits information to passive recipients who dare not question unbridled pedagogical 
authority. Put differently, rhythmic action engenders opportunities for teachers to question and 
be questioned simultaneously and, to rupture and be ruptured – a matter of stimulating students 
to learn through speech and coming to speech. Any action that is accompanied by rhythm has 
a potentiality to produce an alteration within others – a matter of producing change within 
people and texts. Students subjected to an opening of rhythm are summoned to speech by 
educators – that is, they are invited to come to their own conclusions and justifications and in 
turn, evolve into altered others with perhaps more informed views than what they previously 
had. Similarly, rhythmic action engenders opportunities for altering theories and practices along 
the lines of coming interruptions. That is, sometimes theories can be justifiably interrupted to 
alter practices and equally practices can be modified to give rise to more credible theories. The 
point we are making, is that rhythmic action not only enhances the interplay or convergence 
between theory and practices, but also sporadically interrupts the interplay to engender 
interruptions that are striated and inconclusive.   
In sum, rhythmic action appropriately explains the nexus of educational theory and 
practice. Such a nexus is plausible in the sense that educational theory and practice invariably 
inform and consolidate one another. In turn the nexus of theory and practice rebuts linear, 
ordered and foundational action and in turn produces (poiesis) and enacts (praxis) action that is 
chaotic and unconstrained. Hence, such a nexus of educational theory and practice is rhythmic 
as it disrupts the possibility that human action should ever be linear and pre-empted. Such action 
would be remiss of the unexpected possibilities educative relations might engender for those 
who engage in such action.  
 
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: RHYTHMIC ACTION AS A REVERSAL OF  
HUMAN ACTION 
Thus far, in Agamben fashion we have argued for a convergence between poiesis and praxis. 
Davids and Waghid Educational theory as rhythmic action: From Arendt to Agamben 
11 
Like Agamben we contend that all forms of human action should be interpreted as making 
(poiesis) and doing (praxis). In other words, it is implausible to think of making and doing as 
exclusive modes of human action. Rather, poiesis and praxis are convergent human actions held 
together by being open to rhythm. In a way, humans live themselves out productively and 
creatively in work. When such human action is reversed, it immediately sets into motion an 
interruption that reverses the action – that is, in / through interruption, human action is 
(re)produced. This push and pull towards and from an educative activity like teaching, learning 
and managing spawns rhythmic action: Human action manifests in an educative activity and 
simultaneously in an educative activity human action produces itself. This renewed status of 
human action being produced in educative relations – as activities depend on relationships – 
not only blurs the distinction between poiesis and praxis but also gives action a theoretical-
cum-practical impetus. In other words, action brings itself into the presence of educative 
relations. It is this bringing of the self into presence that Agamben (1999, 75) in Aristotelian 
fashion connects with willing action. That is, a human being ‘wills his [her] action and, willing 
it, goes through to its limit’. Moreover, willing action is also linked to rhythm, ‘to flow, as in 
the case of water ... [it] introduces into this eternal flow a split and stop ... something that 
escapes the incessant flight of instants and appears almost as the presence of an atemporal 
dimension’ (Agamben 1999, 99). So, rhythmic action is associated with an interruption or stop 
that reveals the presence of the human will to the educative activity before our eyes. Put 
differently, rhythm holds back or suspends and simultaneously offers or hands over to the 
present. According to Agamben (1999, 101), rhythm gives humans their presence in the world 
in which they willingly pursue their activities such as freedom, alienation, truth and error. 
Now if we further analyse education in terms of rhythmic action it implies that those who 
engage in such a human activity (education, after all, is in the Aristotelian sense a form of social 
action) engage wilfully and hand themselves over to the present – albeit presence of others – 
and offer their judgements and/or understandings of themselves and the world to others. 
Concurrently they willingly suspend or hold back any misunderstandings or misjudgements as 
truths become more pronounced in the face of obvious mistakes being made. This rhythmic 
process of human engagement is constantly produced and reproduced through interruptions that 
cause people to remain in one another’s presence. Humans risk to be provoked and interrogated 
by one another and wilfully suspend irrational flaws as they poetically (making action) and 
praxically (pruding action) (re)construct more defensible reasons in the presence of others. To 
us, Agamben’s use of an Aristotelian conception of rhythm allows us to explain and understand 
education not only as a reiterative backward and forward motion, but as an interruption, 
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suspension and resumption of human action, in which we collapse poiesis and praxis as two 
inseparable human acts. Such a form of education – which interrupts, suspends and resumes ‒ 
would enhance the capability of humans to offer themselves in the presence of others. 
Hopefully, such a rhythmic view of education and its concomitant relations amongst humans 
will harness their (humans’) potential towards free, new and unending processes of becoming 
that, in the words of Arendt (1958, 241), ‘could go on endlessly’. Put differently, whereas 
Arendt and Agamben seem to have in mind autonomous and emancipatory educative relations, 
it is the notion of rhythmic action that offers more promise to cultivate unexpected, and new re-
beginnings.  
This brings us finally to an Agambenian notion of action that integrates poiesis and praxis 
in the quest to foster rhythmic re-beginnings, more specifically educative relations. Whereas, 
an Arendtian notion of action implores humans to be attentive to forgiving and promising in 
starting anew, Agamben’s idea of rhythm pulls and pushes them (humans) towards and away 
from such standard moral concepts. For Arendt (1958, 245), new beginnings are only possible 
if humans are ready to forgive and make promises not to jeopardise their future relations. 
However, at times, it seems inconceivable that the unforgivable, such as the holocaust, will be 
ever forgiven – a condition that might curtail real reconciliation. Following Agamben’s idea of 
being open to rhythm, it implies that sometimes acts of horror and genocide like the holocaust 
can be forgiven and other times not. Hence, Agamben (2002, 69) is reluctant to encourage 
recourse to such moral concepts like forgiveness, promise, dignity and respect:  
 
... Auschwitz marks the end and the ruin of every ethics of dignity and conformity to a norm ... 
The good that the survivors were able to save from the camp – if there is any sense in speaking of 
‘good’ here – is therefore not dignity. On the contrary, the atrocious news that the survivors carry 
from the camp to the land of human beings is precisely that it is possible to lose dignity and 
decency beyond imagination, that there is still life in the most extreme of degradation ... But this 
proximity to death may also have another, more appalling meaning, one which concerns the 
dignity or indignity of death rather than life.  
 
Only when humans pushed themselves towards indignity such as what the survivors of the 
holocaust encountered – for example, having exposed themselves shamefully in nudity – and, 
then pulled away from it – in readiness to be tortured and murdered – could thy have been ready 
for a new form of life based on recognition of rights and justice. In other words, if humans 
recognise the potentiality in them to act both humanely and inhumanely through pulling 
themselves away from what they are pushed towards, then the possibility is always there for 
perhaps more humane interrelationships. In short, to think about something beneficial (poiesis) 
in the quest to cultivate goodness (praxis) would go some way to attain the humanity within a 
world so often confronted with inhumanity.  
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